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Can the proliferation of overlapping patent rights ironically promote efficient
use of patented technologies?

Patent Holdouts in the Standard‐Setting Process
by Doug Lichtman*
Technical standards are often subject to massively overlapping patent
protections. The protocol that governs how information is stored on DVD‐R
media, for example, is known to implicate at least 177 different patents.1 RFID
technology—those electronic tags that Wal‐Mart2 and the Department of
Defense3 increasingly require their suppliers to use—is at this point rumored to
implicate over 4,000.4 Firms interested in implementing heavily patented
protocols like these typically approach the issue by joining together to form a
standard‐setting organization, a patent pool, or some other licensing
intermediary.5 That intermediary endeavors to identify the relevant patents and,
subject to the constraints of antitrust law,6 organize the various patentees such
that interested firms can in the end license necessary patents collectively.
Problem solved? Not quite. At least a few patent holders are inevitably left
out of every collective solution, and over time those patent holders can wreak
havoc on the entire licensing regime. After all, a patent holder whose patent is
identified prior to the adoption of a given standard can at most demand a royalty
that reflects the marginal value of its patented technology.7 There is no other
money on the table. If a patentee demands more, firms interested in the standard
will opt for some other approach. A patent holder whose patent is revealed only
after the standard has gained widespread acceptance, by contrast, is in a
significantly stronger negotiating position. This patentee will still be able to
demand a royalty that reflects the marginal value of its patented technology, but
it will also be able to extract a sizeable payment that is completely unrelated to
that value.
For instance, if an implementing firm would have to disrupt its offerings in
order to change away from an infringing standard, a newly discovered patentee
will be able to demand a share of the savings associated with not having to in
that way interrupt sales. Similarly, if an infringing firm would have to retool its
manufacturing facility in order to exchange the infringing technology for a non‐
infringing alternative, again a newly discovered patentee will be able to cash in
by allowing the infringer to avoid those costs. In short, a patentee that comes into
view only after a firm has invested in a given standard can hold hostage the
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firm’s standard‐specific investments. The result is often a royalty payment that
far exceeds the inherent value of the underlying patented technology.
What to do? What firms do right now is exactly backwards. If a given
technology is going to be vulnerable to ex post patent challenge, an infringer is
better off if there are dozens of credible patent claimants rather than a mere few.
If there are only a few claimants, each will have a strong incentive to sue, as each
will expect to extract significant payments thanks to the holdout dynamic. A
large number of claimants, by contrast, mutes this incentive. Each claimant
knows that it is only one among many patent litigants, and each therefore knows
that the maximum value it will be able to extract will include only a fractional
share of the total holdout value. The more overlapping patents, the smaller that
share, and thus the lower the incentive both to holdout and to sue. At the
extreme, a patented technology subject to thousands of overlapping patents is for
all intents and purposes in the public domain. A patentee that holds just one of
several thousand patents necessary to implement a given standard does not hold
a property right of significant intrinsic value.8 And the holdout value that might
otherwise make litigation attractive on these assumptions divides to zero.
Obviously, there is much more to say. I unpack this idea in four short steps.
In part I, I explain why there will always be patents left outside any licensing
structure. In part II, I show that these patents can in fact be asserted against firms
that did not and could not know of their existence. In part III, I return to the
dynamic outlined above and offer a practical suggestion about how to
implement a licensing strategy that harnesses the ironic benefits of massively
overlapping patent exposure. Finally, in part IV, I briefly conclude, linking my
discussion here to the more general literature on the tragedy of the anti‐
commons.
I. Undiscovered Patents are Inevitable
Firms interested in implementing a given standard often start the process by
putting out a call for relevant patent rights. In November of 2004, for instance,
such a process began with respect to the standard that governs Wi‐Fi
communications: a coordinating body publicly announced that it was looking to
identify any patent that might be essential to implementation of the Wi‐Fi
standard.9 Similar calls have in recent years gone out with respect to the 3G
wireless standard, MPEG data compression protocols, and dozens of other
technical standards.
Some patent holders step forward in response to requests like these. This
might be the best way for patent holders to influence the development of the
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standard and thus to steer it toward an approach that maximizes the value of
their complementary goods and services. Or this might be the best way for
patent holders to encourage widespread adoption of the standard, paving the
way for substantial patent royalties in the future.10
Many patent holders will of course not respond. However, those patent
holders can still sometimes be pressured to step forward. Consider, for example,
a firm that not only holds a relevant patent but also itself wants to implement
products and services compliant with the standard. The various patent holders
who have stepped forward might bring this patent holder into the fold by
announcing that they will license their patents at reasonable rates to all interested
parties, but they will require in return that any licensee likewise license its
relevant patents under similar terms.11 An undiscovered patent holder who
wants to implement the standard might find that tradeoff appealing.
All that said, two categories of patent holders are still beyond reach. The first
includes any patent holder who is at the time unaware of the scope of its patent
portfolio. This might seem to be a small category, and maybe it is,12 but there is at
least some risk that during the standard‐setting process a patent holder will not
realize that it holds relevant rights, but that later either that firm or a patent
clearinghouse will identify the relevant patent and assert it.13 The second
category is made up of patent holders who for strategic reasons intentionally lay
low. These firms understand the holdout dynamic outlined above and they keep
quiet in the hope of ultimately holding out and cashing in accordingly.14
One might suspect that firms interested in implementing a patented
standard can deal with these two categories of patent holdouts by searching the
Patent Office to identify the relevant patent rights. After all, in theory, the quid
pro quo of the patent system is that inventors disclose their inventions to the
public, and in exchange the government grants those inventors exclusive rights
to make, use, or sell the disclosed technologies. That would seem to suggest that
there is an accessible public record of patented technologies, and that firms
nervous about strategic or accidental absentees could simply flip through that
record and identify potential obstacles to their work. Sadly, in practice,
identifying patents in this manner is all but impossible.
Trouble begins with the fact that every patent is written in its own
vocabulary.15 Two patents might thus describe the exact same protocol, but the
descriptions would look nothing alike. To make matters worse, patent language
is subject to hopelessly nuanced rules of interpretation. Indeed, there are actually
cases where the Federal Circuit has struggled to decide “plausible
disagreements” as to the meanings of seemingly innocuous words like “to,”
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“on,” “about,” and “through.”16 In a world with that much hairsplitting—let
alone the large number of patents in force17—identifying and interpreting every
relevant patent is a tall order. This is not to imply that no patents can be
identified by means of a careful search. Often even an amateur eye can spot at
least some relevant patents in short order.18 In practice, however, a firm cannot
hope to reliably identify all previously undiscovered patents relevant to a given
technical standard, and identifying even a subset of such patents is likely an
expensive and time‐consuming task.
But even that understates the problem, in that the very act of searching
increases the searching firm’s legal exposure. Why? Normally, a firm accused of
patent infringement can avoid a charge of willful infringement by showing that
the firm did not know that the relevant patent existed.19 The intuition is that it is
impossible for a firm to intentionally infringe a patent of which it was not aware.
A firm that engages in search, however, risks losing this easy out. The firm might
have thumbed through the patent at issue but failed to realize its import. If so,
the searching firm might find itself on the hook for treble damages—all because
it searched, but interpreted its findings imperfectly. This is why firms in other
settings routinely forbid their employees from looking at newly issued patents.
In patent law, search exposes searchers to too much risk.20
My remarks thus far focus on issued patents. Patents that have not yet been
issued pose even more daunting problems. Patent applications are not made
public until at least eighteen months after filing,21 and a strategic applicant can
toll that clock by (for example) certifying to the Patent Office that the relevant
application has not been filed in any country that requires publication.22
Moreover, patent applications can be filed up to one year after the underlying
technology is publicly known.23 Thus, a technology can be patent‐free when
discussed as a candidate for a given standard, but one year later that technology
might be included in a patent application that would not be made public for at
least eighteen months after that. More troubling still, the Patent Office as it
stands today is not particularly reliable when it comes to evaluating proposed
inventions and weeding out those that do not meet patent law’s stringent
eligibility thresholds.24 This means that a strategic firm might be able to wait
until long after a standard has been adopted and then, despite the formal legal
rules, patent (say) an obvious and necessary improvement. Against that sort of
behavior even careful attempts at search are no answer.
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II. Undiscovered Patents Nonetheless Bind
One might suspect that patent law would protect firms from undiscovered
patents, especially in cases where the infringer in question endeavored in good
faith to identify relevant patent rights. From afar, three patent doctrines look
promising in this regard.
The first is the equitable doctrine of laches, under which a court can in its
discretion deny recovery for any infringement committed prior to the filing of a
patent case.25 Laches is available as an affirmative defense only in instances
where (1) the patentee can be shown to have “unreasonably and inexcusably”
delayed in filing suit26 and (2) that delay materially prejudiced the infringer.27 But
these conditions should be met in the most egregious cases—cases where a
patent holder knowingly sits on its rights and as a result other firms make
significant and irreversible investments in an infringing standard.28 That said,
successful assertion of a defense based on laches accomplishes only so much. The
relevant infringer is off the hook for damages that were incurred before the
litigation was begun, but the infringer is subject to both damages and injunctive
relief from that point forward. A finding of laches is therefore typically a
relatively hollow victory.29
The second relevant doctrine is the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which,
where it applies, excuses infringement on a forward‐looking basis.30 To qualify
for estoppel, an accused infringer must show that (1) the patent owner “through
conduct, positive statement, or misleading silence represent[ed] to the infringer
that his business [would] be unmolested by claims of infringement”31 and (2) in
reliance on that representation,32 the infringer behaved in such a way that (3) it
would be “harmed materially if the [patent holder] is later permitted to assert
any claim inconsistent with his earlier conduct.”33 Estoppel at first blush might
seem to map well to the types of patent controversies likely to arise in the
standard‐setting context. In practice, however, estoppel is a difficult defense to
champion. The second prong is not the issue; as it was with laches, infringers
here would certainly be able to show significant investments specifically made to
conform with the standard. To satisfy the first prong, however, an accused
infringer must show something more than a long delay between the time a
patent holder knew of the alleged infringement and the time of litigation.34 There
needs to be (say) a threat to sue followed by a long period of inaction35 or an
interaction between the parties sufficient to leave the accused infringer under the
reasonable impression that litigation is not in the offing.36 It seems unlikely that a
patent holder hoping to cash in on an infringing standard would make that sort
of error of inconsistency.37
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The last patent doctrine that might dampen the harm caused by
undiscovered patents is a doctrine that derives from section 283 of the Patent
Act. Section 283 authorizes courts in patent disputes to “grant injunctions in
accordance with the principles of equity” and to do so “on such terms as the
court deems reasonable.”38 As the Supreme Court reiterated just a few days ago
in eBay v. MercExchange,39 the implication here is that courts can consider public
policy when deciding whether to authorize injunctive relief in response to
proven on‐going infringement. This might seem—indeed, it might end up
actually being40—a natural safety valve for disputes involving patent holdouts,
where the relevant public policy considerations are (1) the ease with which the
patent holder could have announced its patent before firms invested in the
standard, and (2) the extent to which injunctive relief might empower the
holdout to extract a royalty that exceeds the inherent value of the patented
technology.41 For now, however, courts have not shown much willingness to
consider arguments of this sort.42 The typical explanation is that any public
policy served by denying injunctive relief is outweighed by the various public
policies supporting a strong and reliably enforced patent system.43
III. Safety in Numbers
With that background in mind, it is now easy to explain the ironic benefits of
massively overlapping patent exposure. As I outlined in the introduction, patent
holders whose patents are known from the start can demand at most a royalty
that reflects the marginal value of their patented technologies. Patentees whose
patents are revealed after the standard has gained widespread acceptance, by
contrast, can demand not only a royalty that reflects that intrinsic value but also
a royalty that reflects the value of the infringing firm’s standard‐specific
investments. Importantly, however, the greater the number of patent holders in
the latter position, the less each can expect to earn from this tactic.
This is the insight that is overlooked in the current literature and also missed
in modern licensing practice. If fifteen patent holders can credibly threaten to
shut an infringer for six months while that firm redesigns its products and
services, the value associated with avoiding six months of disruption must be
split fifteen ways. If three hundred patent holders can credibly make that threat,
the pro rata share drops by a factor of twenty. More patents means less money
per patent holder. Less money, in turn, means less of an incentive for a firm to
strategically delay in the hopes of being a patent holdout, and less of an incentive
for an accidental patent holdout to actually bring suit.
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This dynamic can be harnessed to benefit implementing firms. One approach
would have implementing firms stop licensing patent rights entirely. This
approach might be too precarious to actually work,44 but in theory one can
imagine a firm throwing caution to the wind, ignoring all patents relevant to a
given standard, and in the end relying on the threat of overlapping patent
litigation to discourage strategic play. Patent holders might over time step
forward and sue. But those cases would settle for a royalty that approximately
reflects the value of the relevant patents. No patent holder could credibly
demand more because no infringer could possibly pay more. Every infringer
would know that hundreds of other patent claimants are waiting in the wings to
extract their share of the holdout value.45
A safer approach would be to introduce a new licensing provision modeled
after the “most favored nations” clauses that are today already used in the
standard‐setting context.46 Under this approach, licensees would commit to pay
known patent holders a royalty that roughly reflects the value of their
technologies. Licensees would further commit, however, that if any later
patentee can be shown to be earning a rate above that reasonable level, existing
patentees would automatically be entitled to a similarly overstated fee. The
difficulty here would come in defining and policing compliance with the
“reasonable” royalty standard. On this, however, I am cautiously optimistic.
Many licensing organizations today already require their members to price at
“reasonable, non‐discriminatory” rates.47 To date, those organizations have been
relatively successful at first defining and then enforcing that obligation.48 Besides,
the process need not be perfect. A firm might be able to negotiate a royalty
slightly above the permissible level, but royalties significantly above that
threshold would be detected.49
IV. Conclusion
Patent scholars have in recent years grown increasingly worried that the
patent system might inadvertently trigger a “tragedy of the anti‐commons”—a
situation where so many different parties own rights relevant to a given
technology that it becomes difficult for anyone to acquire all the necessary
permissions.50 The result is said to be inefficient under‐use of the technology. I
have focused on this problem as it arises in the context of patented technical
standards, but the problem obviously applies much more broadly, with possible
implications for everything from biomedical science to computer engineering.51
My contribution is to suggest a new solution to the anti‐commons problem.
Yes, where a large number of independent parties hold patents relevant to a
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specific technology, coordination might prove difficult thanks to factors like
transactions costs and strategic play. And yes, as a result, potential licensees
might not be able to gather all the permissions they need to use the patented
technology legally. But there is a silver lining. The large number of overlapping
patents that makes it difficult for firms to license necessary rights at the same
time dampens the costs associated with each specific failure to license. Contrary
to the conventional teachings of the anti‐commons literature, then, some
resources will come into efficient use precisely because there are so many patent
holders who each can plausibly veto another firm’s use.
*
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had granted an implied license).
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37

Not surprisingly, courts commonly treat the laches defense favorably but on the same facts
question whether equitable estoppel has been established. See, e.g., Hottel Corp. v. Seaman
Corp., 833 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (supporting district court finding with respect to laches
but overruling finding with respect to estoppel).

38

35 U.S.C. § 283.

39

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S., Slip Op. No. 05‐130 (May 15, 2006).

40

I am optimistic that, in light of the eBay decision, lower courts will work to identify and then
clearly define specific settings where injunctive relief is inappropriate, perhaps even
embracing as relevant the two factors I mention in the text. That said, the path from here to
there is still considerably uncertain, as even the “unanimous” Court seemed divided on the
details of when injunctions are and are not appropriate.

41

Interestingly, when it comes to calculating a reasonable royalty, courts explicitly measure
value in comparison to non‐infringing alternatives that could have been adopted at the time of
the original infringement. See, e.g., Joy Technologies Inc. v. Flakt Inc., 954 F. Supp. 796, 803 (D.
Del. 1996); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1159‐62 (6th Cir. 1978). It
would seem only natural to import this same consideration into a court’s analysis of
injunctive relief; yet, as I point out in the text, courts to date refuse to do so.

42

The Federal Circuit itself was reluctant to consider arguments like these, seemingly favoring
an almost automatic injunction barring extraordinary circumstances. See MercExchange,
L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

43

See, e.g., A.W. Industries Inc. v. Electronic Connector Service Inc., 46 USPQ2d 1218, 1224 (S.D.
Fla. 1997) (ʹʹThe public interest is clearly served by protecting rights secured by valid
patents.ʹʹ); Colonial Data Technologies Corp. v. Cybiotronics Ltd., 41 USPQ2d 1763, 1769‐70
(D. Conn. 1996) (ʹʹwhile we recognize a public interest favoring continued competition, . . . we
believe here this interest is outweighed by the publicʹs interest in enforcing this presumptively
valid patent”); LifeScan Inc. v. Polymer Technology International Corp., 35 USPQ2d 1225,
1241 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (ʹʹalthough there are advantages to the public in being able to
purchase low‐cost medical products, the public interest favors the granting of an injunction”;
“Congress has made the legislative determination that it is not in the public interest to permit
the infringement of . . . temporary monopolies as it undermines inventor incentive.ʹʹ).

44

One wrinkle, for instance, is whether patent holdouts might show up at different times, with
one (say) threatening to disrupt the implementing firm right now and then another showing
up to threaten disruption in six months. How this sort of dynamic would play out depends
on, among other things, the life cycle of the relevant product, the length and cost of any
disruption, the number of patent holdouts, the relative scope and strength of each patent, the
costs associated with litigation, the amount of time between the filing of a patent suit and the
issuance of any injunctive relief, and the ability of patent holdouts to coordinate their efforts. I
am separately working to model this interaction, but, as I say in the text, this large number of
variables makes the strategy strike me as unacceptably precarious for current purposes.

45

For the same reasons, an individual cannot pay blackmail in an instance where the first party
to demand payment is only one of a thousand individuals privy to the same embarrassing
information.
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46

MFN provisions are currently used to promise licensees that no other licensee will receive
better terms. An example is the MFN provision found in section 6.1 of the DVD Patent License
Agreement. The relevant language reads: “[I]n the event that Licensor grants a DVD patent
license to another party with royalty rates more favorable” than those specified in the
Agreement, “Licensor shall send written notice to Licensee” and “Licensee shall be entitled to
an amendment to this Agreement to the extent of providing for royalty rates as favorable as
those available to such other party.” The full license is available online at
<http://www.dvd6cla.com/ CategorizedAgreement_Sample.pdf> (last visited May 1, 2006).

47

I refer here to what is known as RAND licensing, which is an abbreviation for licensing on a
“reasonable and non‐discriminatory” basis. Many standard‐setting organizations require
members to license in this manner. Lemley, supra note 10, at 1906. Royalty rates vary from
licensee to licensee, but they must in general be set at reasonable rates that roughly
correspond to the value of the underlying technology.

48

Naturally, there are occasional disputes over whether a given licensing agreement satisfies
RAND obligations. Nevertheless, major standard‐setting organizations like the IEEE (Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) and the ISO (International Organization for
Standardization) support the use of this licensing term, as do firms whose businesses rely
heavily on successful standard‐setting, like Microsoft and IBM.

49

A third approach would be for a firm to license patents subject to an obligation to sue. That is,
a firm would sign contracts with known patent holders under which those patent holders
would agree not to sue the firm for implementing the infringing standard. However, there
would be one exception: those patent holders would affirmatively commit to sue in the event
that any other patent holder sues the licensee. I do not put this approach forward in the text
because it turns out to be subject to its own version of the patent holdout problem. Suppose,
for example, that 999 of 1000 relevant patent holders sign this contract. There now remains
only one outsider who can plausibly threaten to sue. True, if that outsider actually goes
through with the threat, he earns no more than a reasonable royalty and in addition must
spend money on litigation. But if the outsider goes through with the threat, the infringer also
suffers: he must defend 1000 lawsuits and he will ultimately need to share the holdout value
with all thousand firms. The outsider can thus hold this set of expenses hostage, and thus the
problem of patent holdout returns. Note that this same difficulty does not arise in the context
of the most favored nations clause, because there an outsider cannot cash in on such a threat.
If the outsider receives any cash, the clause is triggered.

50

The most prominent article along these lines is Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 641, 641‐788
(May 1, 1998). The phrase “tragedy of the anti‐commons” was originally coined by Frank
Michelman, but Heller developed the concept significantly in his article, Michael A. Heller,
The Tragedy of the Anti‐Commons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 621 (1998).

51

See, among many others, Nari Lee, Patent Eligible Subject Matter Reconfiguration and the
Emergence of Proprietarian Norms: The Patent Eligibility of Business Methods, 45 IDEA 321
(2005) (considering whether this concern applies to computer software and business method
patents); Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2001)

13

(arguing that this concern justifies a broader experimental use exception); Clarissa Long,
Property Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 Emory L.J. 823 (2000) (discussing the
implications of the anti‐commons and possible responses like consensual licensing through
intermediaries).
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Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Douglas Lichtman
University of Chicago Law School
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